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INDIANA LEGISLATION-1947
The trustee in bankruptcy is under a statutory duty to
record the order approving his bond.' The purpose of such
recordation is to constitute constructive notice of the com-
mencement of bankruptcy proceedings.2 However, the re-
cordation does not constitute constructive notice unless state
laws authorize the recording.8 Under the Indiana enabling
act, the bankrupt is divested of his power to convey real
estate during the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings pro-
viding the trustee obeys his Congressional mandate to record.4
Comparable legislation has been enacted in Kansas, Ohio, and
Virginia.5
CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS
Chapter 239 of the acts of 1947 provides for the organiza-
tion of conservancy districts within the state.' Although the
provision is original legislation in Indiana, similar laws have
been in force in sister states for some time.2
1. 52 Stat. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §75 (c) (1943).
2. "A certified copy of the petition with the schedules omitted, of
the decree of adjudication or of the order approving the trustee's
bond may be recorded at any time in the office where convey-
ances of real property are recorded in every county where the
bankrupt owns or has an interest in real property. Such cer-
tified copy may be recorded by the bankrupt, trustee, receiver,
custodian, referee or any creditor . . . unless a certified copy of
the petition, decree, or order has been recorded in such office,
in any county wherein the bankrupt owns or has an interest in
real property in any state whose laws authorize such recording,
the commencement of a proceeding under this act shall not be
constructive notice to affect the title of any bona fide purchaser
. . " 52 Stat. 852 (1938) 11 U.S.C. §44 (g) (Supp. 1946).
3. Observe supra n. 2, the express Congressional recognition of state
authorization of recordation.
4. See Vombrack v. Wavra, 331 Ill. 508, 163 N.E. 340 (1928) where
the bona fide vendee was protected in such a situation. In con-
struing 52 Stat. 852 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §44(g) (Supp. 1946), Col-
lier says, "Its purpose is apparent. Where real estate of the
bankrupt or in which the bankrupt has an interest is located out-
side the county where the bankruptcy proceeding is pending, it is
possible for a fraudulent bankrupt to sell the real estate, or his
interest therein to an innocent purchaser who has no knowledge
or reasonable means of knowledge of the pendency of bankruptcy
proceeding." 2 Collier "Bankruptcy" (14th ed., 1940) §21.30.
5. Kansas Laws 1945, c. 244; Ohio Laws 1943, p. 705; Va. Code
(Michie, 1942) §5216(c) and (d).
1. The law provides a comprehensive scheme for the reclamation,
irrigation, or drainage of lands and the prevention of floods. The
nine specific purposes for which a conservancy district may be
organized are set out in §3.
2. Colo. Stat. Ar. (Michie, et al., 1935) c. 138 §126; Minn. Stat.
(Henderson, 1941) §111.01 et seq.; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page,
19471
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Conservancy districts are to be established by petitioning
the circuit court of the circuit within which the land of the
proposed district is locatedA If the proposed district contains
land situated in several judicial circuits, the judges of these
circuits are to sit as a trial court4 to determine whether or
not the conservancy district prayed for in the petition shall
be established. This court has power to adopt rules of prac-
tice and procedure consistent with the provisions of the act
and the general laws of the state. The decisions of the court
in its trial of the issues in the petition are to be subject to
appeal as in other civil causes. Upon the establishment of the
district, the court has the further power to appoint a board
of three directors to manage the district.
Similar acts of other states have fomented much litiga-
tion and have been the targets of many unique if not ingenious
assaults.5 The three principal grounds of attack on similar
statutes have been: (1) that the power to appoint a board
of directors is an improper delegation to the judiciary of
the executive appointive power and a violation of the separa-
tion of powers dotcrine; (2) that a judge is an officer of a
specific court and his judicial capacity is coextensive with
the jurisdiction of the court of which he is an officer; (3)
that the determination of the advisability or desirability of
a conservancy district is primarily a legislative question and
1937) §6828.1 et seq, The Indiana law is nearly identical to the Ohio
law and appears to have been modeled after it.
3. The petition which initiates the proceedings for the establishment
of a conservancy district must be signed by 500 freeholders or a
majority of the freeholders of the proposed district and filed with
the clerk of the circuit court of any circuit in which the proposed
district lies. It must set out the name of and necessity for the
proposed district, and contain a description of the land and a
prayer for organization. §4. As to the number of signatures re-
quired on the petition, compare: Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, et aL,
1935) c. 138 §128 (200 owners or a majority of the owners within
the proposed district); Minn. Stat. (Henderson, 1941) §111.04 (25
per cent of the freeholders but in no event more than 50 signatures
may be required); Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) §6828-3
(500 freeholders or a majority of the freeholders or the owners
of more than half the property, in either acreage or value, within
the proposed district).
4. The law by its very terms indicates that the legislature is not
contemplating an administrative body, but a new and distinct court
in those cases where the land within the proposed district lies in
more than one judicial circuit. §6.
5. So much so that one court has been led to comment: "Rarely has
a law been found which has been assailed with such frequency or
from so many angles". Silvey v. Comr. of Montgomery Co, Ohio,
273 F. 202, 206 (S.D. Ohio 1921).
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thrusting such a determination upon a court is an improper
delegation of legislative power and a further violation of the
separation of powers doctrine.
Of these arguments, the first has proven least effective
in other states" and the Indiana decisions indicate that this
provision alone will not invalidate the act- In connection
with the second argument it should be noted that the validity
of the provision for a separate court composed of the judges
of the several circuits, hinges primarily on the constitution
of the particular state. While the Supreme Court of Kansas
has held8 that a judge chosen for one judicial district cannot
be empowered to transplant his judicial authority to another
judicial district and exercise his authority there, this would
seem a weak argument in view of the Indiana Constitution.
The legislative intent to establish a separate and distinct
court is plain9 and the establishment of such courts seems
a valid exercise of the constitutional power of the legislature
to establish "other courts". 0
In respect to the last argument, the cases are not in ac-
cord on what constitutes a delegation of legislative power to
the judiciary." The courts of other states on undistinguish-
6. In People v. Lee, 72 Colo. 598, 213 P. 583 (1923) the Supreme
Court of Colorado after holding that the organization of a con-
servancy district was a proper judicial function further held that
the court's power to appoint the directors of the district did not
violate the statute since it was incidental to the performance of ajudicial function. In a similar attack upon the Ohio conservancy
act the Ohio court held that the power to appoint the directors
of the district was no more a delegation of the appointive power
than was the power to appoint receivers or appraisers in given
cases. Miami Co. v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, 110 N.E. 726 (1915).
The Minnesota courts have likewise sustained the judicial appoint-
ment of the directors of a conservancy district. State v. Flaherty,
140 Minn. 19, 167 N.W. 122 (1918).
7. State ex rel School City of South Bend v. Thompson, 211 Ind.
267, 6 N.E. (2d) 710 (1937) (judicial appointment of a county
board of tax review held valid); Wilkison v. Board of Children's
Guardians, 158 Ind. 1, 62 N.E. 481 (1901) (appointment of mem-
bers of a guardians board by court held not violative of the con-
stitution as a delegation of executive power); City of Terre Haute v.
Evansville and Terre Haute R.R. Co., 149 Ind. 174, 46 N.E. 77
(1897) (appointment of city commissioners by court held not an
improper delegation of legislative or executive power).
8. In Re Verdigris Conservancy Dist., 131 Kan. 214, 289 P. 966 (1930).
9. See n. 4 supra.
10. Ind. Const. Art. 7, §1.
11. A discussion of the separation of powers problem in respect to
the delegation of legislative power to the judiciary may be found
in Note (1930) 69 A.L.R. 266. It should be noted that Burnett
v. Greene, 97 Fla. 1007, 122 So. 570 (1929), one of the two prin-
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able conservancy statutes have clearly obtained contrary re-
sults. The Colorado,12 Minnesota," and Ohio'4 conservancy
acts have successfully withstood the charge that they dele-
gate legislative power to the courts in the organization of
conservancy districts. However, the Supreme Court of Kan-
sas has held that the Kansas law, for which the Ohio law
served as a model, was unconstitutional because it granted
legislative power to the judiciary.15  These decisions appear
to be rationalized only upon the attitude of the particular ju-
diciary toward the separation of powers doctrine and the ex-
tent to which it believes that the doctrine has gone by the
board, or does not demand rigid adherance in instances where
the judiciary is not encumbered by the added burden and the
public needs will be served. The Indiana Courts have taken
a liberal view toward separation of powers in other situations
and have not required a strict enforcement of the doctrine."
In view of these precedents it would appear that the court's
power to organize conservancy districts would not constitute
a violation of the separation of powers doctrine in Indiana.
CONTRACTS, SALES AND ASSIGNMENTS
Assignment of Wages. Assignment of wages by employ-
ees for the following additional purposes were validated:'
(1) installment purchase of stock of the employer-company or
its subsidiaries pursuant to a written purchase agreement,
provided that the employee may cancel the agreement at any
cipal cases there annotated was reversed on rehearing. The court
on rehearing held that the judicial establishment of drainage dis-
tricts was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Burnett v. Greene, 105 Fla. 35, 144 So. 265 (1932). The delegation
of powers problem is also discussed in Note (1929) 64 A.L.R. 1335.
12. People v. Lee, 72 Colo. 598, 213 P. 583 (1923).
13. State v. Flaherty, 140 Minn. 19, 167 N.W. 122 (1918).
14. Silvey v. Comr. of Montgomery Co., Ohio, 273 F. 202 (S.D. Ohio
1921).
15. In Re Verdigris Conservancy Dist., 131 Kan. 214, 289 P. 966 (1930).
16. Town of St. John v. Gerlach, 197 Ind. 289, 150 N.E. 771 (1925)(disannexation of territory from cities and towns by the judiciary
held not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to
the judiciary); Paul v. Town of Walkerton, 150 Ind. 565, 50 N.E.
725 (1898) (held that the circuit court, on appeal, had power tohear and determine an annexation case de novo, and to render
final judgment, annexing or refusing to annex such territory,
without regard to the result before the board of commissioners);
Note (1930) 69 A.L.R. 266, 269.
1. Chapter 330, amending Ind. Acts, 1945 c. 183, §2, Ind. Stat. Ann.(Burns, Supp. 1945) §40-214.
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